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OUTSIDE INVESTORS: A NEW BREED
OF INSIDER TRADERS?
EL YSE DIAMOND
INTRODUCTION
Technological advances in computer and telecommunication systems
have promoted the internationalization of the securities markets by en-
abling investment activity on a global scale, virtually without interrup-
tion.1 This increased participation,2 however, has heightened the
opportunity for widespread abuse of securities laws, particularly encour-
aging insider trading violations.3 At the same time, the increasing com-
plexity of investment activity has made enforcement of securities
regulations more difficult.4
This Note will examine the effects of the growth of transnational par-
ticipation in securities trading on the development and enforcement of
insider trading laws around the world. Part I provides an overview of
the development, current status, and existing substantive regulations of
insider trading laws in the United States, and also reviews the potential
for further legislation outside of the United States. This Part further in-
cludes a general comparison of key aspects of domestic and foreign regu-
lations. Part II then examines the problems with the attempted
application and enforcement of insider trading regulations within the
framework of international trading participation. This Part focuses on
problems of extraterritorial application and enforcement of United States
insider trading laws and considers the progress that has been made in
dealing with these limitations. Finally, this Note concludes that while
substantial measures are being taken by the Securities Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") and some foreign securities regulators to promote the
1. See Gruson, The Global Securities Market." Introductory Remarks, 1987 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 303, 305-06 [hereinafter Global Securities Market]. Other factors promoting
the internationalization of the securities markets include: domestic economic growth, the
volatility of domestic financial markets, and the impact of national "political and eco-
nomic philosophies" regarding securities regulation. It at 304-05.
2. In 1988 alone, "foreign direct investment in [the United States] totaled $328.9
billion." Foreign Investment in U.S. Exceeds American Investment Abroad Last Year, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1638 (Nov. 3, 1989). "By one estimate, world stock market
capitalization grew from 2.5 trillion dollars in 1980 to 8.2 trillion dollars in 1988 and the
dollar volume of trading in U.S. equity securities by foreign investors rose from S75.5
billion in 1981 to $481.9 billion in 1987." Insider Trading, The Internationalization of the
Securities Markets and the SEC's Enforcement Program, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1376, 1376 n.1 (Sept. 20, 1991) [hereinafter SEC's Enforcement Program] (citing Goelzer
and Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International Enforcement of the United States
Securities Laws, 16 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 145 (1990)).
3. See House Committee Report Critical of SEC's International Enforcement, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1551 (Oct. 14, 1988). The Committee estimated that uninvesti-
gated foreign trades in 168 reports of suspicious trading activity referred to the SEC
yielded "gross potential profits.., of at least $38.1 million." Id.
4. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1376.
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enforcement of insider trading prohibitions, continued development of
foreign law and increased international cooperation are essential to main-
tain control over insider trading activity in this complex global market.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS
The development of transnational securities trading brings new chal-
lenges for national authorities charged with enforcing national securities
regulations. Interaction of national insider trading laws is inevitable in
the current global market, and effective control over insider trading at
the international level is impossible without a commitment by individual
countries to police this activity. For this reason, the starting point for
international regulation of insider trading must be at the national level.
A. Insider Trading Regulations in the United States
The United States relies on a centralized regulatory system to govern
insider trading,5 the enforcement of which is the responsibility of the
SEC.6 United States securities regulation is founded on a system of dis-
closure.7 These laws set guidelines for the disclosure of information to
investors by issuers of corporate securities.' The SEC, in turn, is charged
with enforcing these disclosure rules.
1. Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Section 10(b)
The authority to regulate insider trading in the United States derives
principally from Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(" '34 Act"), a criminal anti-fraud section 9 implemented by the SEC as
Rule lOb-5. 10 Neither Rule lOb-5 nor the section from which it derived,
however, includes a definition of insider trading or even uses this express
terminology. Instead, Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful to employ any "de-
vice, scheme or artifice to defraud," to omit or make an untrue statement
of material fact, or to operate a fraud or deceit on any person in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security."
5. Some individual states, however, have enacted their own insider trading regula-
tions as well. For example, New York law uses language similar to Rule 10(b), see 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991), prohibiting the use of "fraud, deception, concealment, sup-
pression, false pretense" to induce or promote the sale of securities in this state. See N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law § 352-c (Consol. 1980).
6. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885
(1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1981)) [hereinafter "'34 Act"].
7. See Rasmussen, An Overview of Insider Trading Laws in the United States, 9 Int'l
Bus. L. 389, 389 (1981).
8. See id.
9. '34 Act, supra note 6, § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kkk (1988)).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
11. See id.
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Since its inception, this amorphous definition of insider trading has
lent itself to broad extensions of liability under the statute and to differ-
ing interpretations among federal courts of what constituted an offense
pursuant to the '34 Act. 2 Developing from common law, it gradually
"became an established principle of federal law under rule lOb-5 that
insiders owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure when engaged in face-to-face
purchases or sales with corporate shareholders."' 3 Eventually, this duty
was extended to insiders who trade, even impersonally, in breach of a
fiduciary duty.
1 4
In 1980, the Supreme Court narrowed lower courts' interpretations of
the '34 Act in a landmark insider trading case, Chiarella v. United
States.15 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the '34
Act requires a showing that one owing a fiduciary duty to disclose or to
abstain from trading has breached this duty by fraudulently using non-
public material information in connection with the trading of securities.' 6
This is known as "abstain or disclose" liability. The Court reversed de-
fendant Chiarella's criminal conviction under the '34 Act, holding that
Chiarella did not have a sufficiently close relationship with the sellers of
the subject company's securities to trigger the duty of disclosure required
for liability under Rule 10b-5. 7 In particular, the Court held that ab-
stain or disclose liability does not arise "from the mere possession of non-
public market information," and that therefore no fraud had been
perpetrated by Chiarella.' 8
Abstain or disclose liability, as defined by the Court in Chiarella, also
has been found to extend to "tippees"-investors who trade based on
12. See D. Langevoort, Insider Trading Regulation 36 (1989). Regarding the inter-
pretations of the duty of disclosure under Rule lOb-5, compare Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951) ("duty of disclosure stems from the neces-
sity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage
of the uniformed minority stockholders"), reaff'd, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951), 103
F. Supp. 47 (D. DeL 1952) and Karden v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800
(E.D. Pa. 1947) (duty to disclose under lOb-5 arises when "directors and officers ... in
purchasing the stock of the corporation from others, fail to disclose a fact coming to their
knowledge by reason of their position, which would materially affect the judgement of the
other party to the transaction").
13. D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 39.
14. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The SEC's opinion reasoned that
the defendants access to the confidential information as a matter of course in his corpo-
rate position, and the unfair advantage this gave him, made it reasonable to subject him
to liability. See id. at 912. The Supreme Court's ruling in Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980), however, has ostensibly invalidated earlier common law interpretations
of Rule lob-5. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
15. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
16. See id at 228. Chiarella, an employee of Pandick Press, knowingly violated com-
pany policy by discovering the identity of the subject company of a tender offer from
confidential materials prepared by Pandick and subsequently purchasing that company's
securities before the bid was revealed. See id. at 224.
17. See id. at 232-33.
18. Id. at 235.
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inside information obtained from a company insider. 9 In Dirks v.
SEC,20 the Supreme Court established that a tippee "assumes a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material non-
public information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty
to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach."'" Tippee
liability further requires that the tippee knew, or should have known,
that the tipper communicated the information for personal gain.22
Despite the broad reach of the law, the success of the '34 Act was
hindered by the SEC's limited resources for investigating and prosecuting
potential violators, as well as by the limited penalties available under the
statute.23 Convicted violators faced only injunction of future violations
and disgorgement of the illegally obtained profits.24
2. Enactment of Further Legislation: 1984 and 1988
As a result of the enforcement problems of the '34 Act, Congress
passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ("ITSA").25 ITSA
amended the '34 Act to impose penalties where there has been a violation
of any provision of the '34 Act by the sale or purchase of "a security
while in possession of material nonpublic information. '26 ITSA sub-
jected violators to more stringent sanctions including a possible forced
return of up to three times the illegally obtained profits.27
Despite ITSA's improvements to the '34 Act, the well-publicized in-
sider trading scandals involving Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky evinced
the need for further deterrence of insider trading28 and led to the enact-
ment of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
19. See D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 44.
20. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
21. Id. at 660. Dirks, an investment analyst, advised clients to sell shares of Equity
Funding of America after learning of its fraudulent practices from a former employee of
that company. See id. at 649. The Court held that no liability existed as Dirks did not
receive confidential information from a company insider breaching a fiduciary duty. See
id. at 665.
22. See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 592 F. Supp. 592, 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that tippee liability requires the tippee have "knowledge of each
element, including the personal benefit, of the tipper's breach") (emphasis in original).
23. See D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 59.
24. See id.
25. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).
26. d. § (2)(A).
27. See id.
28. See Ingersoll, Political Pressure Building to Stem Trading Excesses, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 17, 1986, at 29, col. 5 (Eastern ed.); Swartz & Ingersoll, Wall Street May Face Big
Changes in Wake of the Boesky Scandal. Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern
ed.); see also 134 Cong. Rec. 23,595, 23,597-9 (remarks of the House Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce on need for new insider trading legislation in light of Wall Street
scandals).
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1988.29 Any individual who purchases or sells securities contemporane-
ously with a violator's purchase or sale of the same security is given a
private right of action under this Act.30 This Act also expanded the
scope of liability by allowing the imposition of penalties against control-
ling persons who "knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such con-
trolled person was likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the
violation and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such act or acts
before they occurred."'" Other provisions of the Act require brokers,
dealers, and investment advisors to enact written policies for the preven-
tion of insider trading.32 Insider trading remains undefined under United
States law, and the development of SEC regulation under these statutes
continues in modem case law.3 3
3. The Misappropriation Theory of Liability: From the Chiarella
Dissent
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Chiarella left undecided
whether, in addition to "abstain or disclose" liability, Rule lOb-5 imposes
liability for insider trading under the "misappropriation" theory. 3 Pur-
suant to this theory, a violation of Rule lOb-5 occurs when one entrusted
with confidential information misuses this knowledge by secretly trading
on it for personal gain.35 This theory attaches the requisite breach of
fiduciary duty to the entruster of the private information rather than to
the shareholders of the company whose stock was traded.3 6 The Second
Circuit has explicitly adopted this interpretation of lOb-5.37 More re-
cently, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted the misappropria-
29. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30. See id § 5.
31. Id § 3(a)(2).
32. See id §§ 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (charging
a psychiatrist with using inside information obtained from a patient-held that because
the information was learned during a confidential session with the patient, the defendant
need not have been told that the information was confidential); see also For the First
Time Jury Finds Tippee Liable Based On Circumstantial Evidence, 22 Sec. Reg. & L
Rep. (BNA) 1539 (Nov. 11, 1990) (discussing United States District Court of Utah find-
ing of tippee liability purely on the basis of circumstantial evidence).
34. The majority did not rule on the validity of the misappropriation theory because
it held that the jury was improperly charged on this theory. See Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980). In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger found support for a
theory of liability based on misappropriation under Rule 10b. See id at 240 (dissenting).
For an in depth analysis of this theory, see D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 147-75.
35. See D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 147.
36. See id
37. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983). Newman misappropriated confidential information regarding proposed
mergers and acquisitions that he learned from two employees of two investment firms
whose various clients confided this information to the firms. The court held that New-
man was liable under Rule lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory. See id. at 15-16.
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tion theory.3 s
In Carpenter v. United States,3 9 the Supreme Court affirmed by a di-
vided vote a 10b-5 conviction premised on the misappropriation theory.
The Court, however, did not deliver an opinion on this issue of the case,
so the validity of the misappropriation theory of liability remains uncer-
tain. In addition, the Carpenter Court also found a violation of the fed-
eral criminal wire fraud and mail statutes under a misappropriation
theory. 4°
4. Section 16(b) of the '34 Act
Section 16(b) of the '34 Act41 was designed to regulate specified insider
trading activity, and has a much narrower application than Rule lOb-5.
Section 16(b) prohibits an officer, director, or "beneficial owner"42 from
purchasing and selling securities for profit within a six month period
based on information learned through his or her relationship with the
issuer.43 This type of trading is known as short-swing trading. 4
An action under 16(b) may be brought only by the corporate issuer or
a shareholder, and recovery is limited to the profits earned from the pro-
hibited activity.45 Significantly, Section 16(b) does not require that the
38. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,
453 (9th Cir. 1990). After being fired from his position at First National Bank of Chi-
cago, Cherif secretly returned to the bank on various occasions to obtain confidential
information regarding buyouts and tender offers being handled by the bank. See Cherif,
933 F.2d at 406. Cherif was convicted of insider trading under the misappropriation
theory even though he was no longer an employee of the bank at the time of the trading.
See id. at 411. The Ninth Circuit found Clark guilty under the misappropriation theory
for tipping material nonpublic information regarding his employer's plans to buy another
company. See Clark, 915 F.2d at 441.
39. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
40. See id. at 24. Violations of mail and wire fraud statutes are brought by the United
States Justice Department rather than the SEC. The Court's acceptance of this theory
for violations of those statutes, however, keeps alive the potential for use of this theory by
the SEC in insider trading cases. See Note, A Comparative Analysis of Insider Trading
Laws: The United States, the United Kingdom and Japan - The Current International
Agreements on Securities Regulation, 13 Suffolk Transnat'l L.J. 167, 176 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Comparative Analysis].
41. '34 Act, supra note 6, § 16(b), 48 Stat. at 896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1988)).
42. The statute provision is applicable to all beneficial owners holding more than ten
percent of the outstanding stock. See id.
43. See generally Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of
Publicly Held Companies, 42 Hastings L. Rev. 391 (1990-91) (detailing the enactment of
Section 16 and the purpose of Section 16(b)).
44. See D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 282.
45. Profits under Section 16(b) are calculated by compiling a list of all purchases and
sales made during the requisite period and matching the lowest purchase price with the
highest selling price for the same number of shares, until all of the purchases and sales
have been accounted for. See L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 634 (1983).
This formula maximizes the profits earned by the offender thereby creating the largest
possible penalty.
S324 [Vol. 60
INSIDER TRADING REGULA TION
trade involve material or nonpublic information.4 Section 16(b), unlike
Rule lOb-5, is thus limited by its application to short-swing trades and by
its application to only specified inside traders.
5. Rule 14e-3 of the '34 Act
A final regulatory tool in the United States is Rule 14e-3,1 adopted by
the SEC in 1980 to regulate illegal trading of material nonpublic infor-
mation concerning tender offers.48 As adopted, Rule 14e-3 does not re-
quire a breach of a fiduciary duty in order to trigger liability. 49 The
Second Circuit recently issued an en banc decision confirming the valid-
ity of 14e-3 absent this requirement.50 The court held that "the language
and legislative history of section 14(e) [of the '34 Act], as well as congres-
sional inactivity toward it since the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3(a), all
support the view that Congress empowered the SEC to prescribe a rule
that extends beyond the common law."'"
B. Insider Trading Regulation Abroad
The current globalization of securities trading mandates the interna-
tional enforcement of insider trading prohibitions.5 2 Worldwide cooper-
ation is essential to the successful deterrence of insider trading because of
the absence of any uniform international regulation. 3 The likelihood of
obtaining foreign assistance may depend on the extent to which other
countries have enacted insider trading legislation.5'4
1. Regulation Among the European Community Member States
Like the United States, the United Kingdom also has a centralized
system for securities regulation, including insider trading." The United
Kingdom first imposed criminal sanctions for insider trading with the
Companies Act of 1980 ("Companies Act").56 This Act makes it illegal
46. See 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, International Capital Markets and Securities
Regulation § 1.08[5][b], at 1-117 (1991).
47. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1991).
48. See id
49. See id. Instead of applying the fiduciary principle, pursuant to this Section any
person who trades securities based on material information relating to a tender offer that
he knows or should know is nonpublic is liable. See id
50. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 563 (2d Cir. 1991).
51. Id at 560.
52. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; see also Ferrara & Fields, SEC Ex-
pands Enforcement Role to the International Marketplace, Nat'l LJ., Apr. 24, 1989, at 26
(discussing the overwhelming increase in amount of securities sold and purchased
abroad).
53. See id
54. See D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 30.
55. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. As a member nation the United
Kingdom will also be subject to the minimum standards established in the EC insider
trading Directive.
56. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73 (Eng.).
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to "buy or sell a security on the London Stock Exchange (now the Inter-
national Stock Exchange or ISE) on the basis of unpublished specific in-
formation likely to materially affect the market price of the stock if the
defendant knew the information was price sensitive." ' The Company
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act of 198558 extends criminal liability to
trading of "advertised securities through an 'off market' dealer.'" 9 This
Act was amended in 1986 to include civil penalties as well.
Pursuant to the Insider Dealing Act, it is unlawful for anyone con-
nected with a company, or anyone who gets information from a con-
nected person, to trade on what he knows is specific "unpublished, price
sensitive information" relating to the security.' The Act defines a
"'connected person' [as] one who is a director, an officer, or an employee
of a company or a related company, or one who occupies a position in-
volving a professional or business relationship with that company or re-
lated company. ' 61 The Act also prohibits "tipping" of such information
when it is reasonably foreseeable to the tipper that the information will
be used for illegal trading.62 Defenses under this statute include a show-
ing that the trading was not for profit, or that the trading was done "in
good faith in the course of [the trader's] function as a liquidator, receiver,
or trustee in bankruptcy. 63
Prosecutions under the Insider Dealing Act are conducted by the De-
partment of Trade and Industry ("DTI"). The specificity of the regula-
tions, coupled with the prosecution's burdensome proof requirements,
makes obtaining convictions difficult for the DTI and limits the useful-
ness of the United Kingdom's otherwise comprehensive insider trading
regulations." Under British law, the alleged offender must be shown to
have had actual knowledge that the trade involved nonpublic and price
sensitive information.65
France has also enacted criminal statutes prohibiting insider trading of
securities listed on exchanges. 66 Regulation began in 1967 with the es-
tablishment of the Commission des Operations de Bourse ("COB"), the
57. 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 108[5][b], at 1-118.
58. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8 (Eng.).
59. 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 108[5][b], at 1-118. This is an
important step for effective enforcement because "[ain active market is developing among
dealers away from organized stock exchanges to meet investors' demand for international
trading opportunities." Cox, Internationalization of the Capital Markets: The Experience
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, I1 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 201, 209 (1987).
60. 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 108[5][b], at 1-119.
61. Id at 1-118.
62. See id. at 1-119.
63. Morse, United Kingdom, in 10A International Capital Markets and Securities
Regulation § 6.13[2], at 6-48-9 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1991).
64. See 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 1.08[5][b], at 1-122.
65. See Companies Act, 1980 ch. 22, § 68(1)(c); Insider Dealing Act, supra note 58,
§ (1)(c).
66. See discussion on the EC Directive infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
S326 [Vol. 60
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
agency charged with investigating securities violations.67 Liability under
French law extends to insiders, defined as "the president, the directors,
and the members of the administrative or supervisory council of a corpo-
ration," and to any other person who has obtained inside information in
the course of professional work.68 French law imposes a stringent bur-
den of proof; this requirement increases the difficutly of obtaining a crim-
inal conviction and makes the statute more difficult to enforce.69 In
addition, the narrow interpretation given to "inside information" has
sharply limited the application of the French law. This information is
required to be" 'precise, specific and certain' ,,70 and refers only to infor-
mation regarding the "technical, commercial or financial" aspects of a
company.71 Finally, the COB's efforts to investigate insider trading cases
have at times been frustrated by limitations on jurisdiction.'
Denmark is the final European Community nation to promulgate an
insider trading law. Pursuant to legislation enacted in 1986, anyone who
trades on a Danish stock market 3 benefitted by nonpublic information is
subject to criminal liability. 4 Contrary to United States insider trading
law, the Danish system does not distinguish between insiders and
outsiders.75
In order to promote investor confidence in the developing single Euro-
pean market, the Commission of the European Community (the "EC")76
developed a proposal establishing uniform minimum standards for in-
sider trading regulation among its member states.77 The proposed Direc-
tive extends liability to both fiduciaries and tippees and, unlike the
American statutes, includes a definition of inside information.'8 Under
the Directive, inside information is nonpublic information that "'would
have a significant impact on the price of shares if it were made pub-
ic.' ,,7 The Directive also establishes what one expert has described as
67. Ordinance 67-833 (1967) (Fr.).
68. Miller, France, in 10A International Capital Markets and Securities Regulation
§ 7.1612], at 7-37 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1991).
69. See id
70. Id § 7.16[2], at 7-38.
71. 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 1.08[5][c], at 1-123.
72. See id. at 1-124 n.8 (citing Robert, International Cooperation: The Obstacles Met
by the C O.B. and the Directions Followed, in ALI-ABA Conference on Internationaliza-
tion of Capital Markets 256-57 (1981)).
73. See discussion on the EC Directive infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
74. See Note, Toward the Unification of European Capital Markets" The EECs Pro-
posed Directive on Insider Trading, 11 Fordham Int'l LJ. 432, 442 (1988) [hereinafter
Unification].
75. See id
76. The EC is comprised of twelve member nations: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Re-
public of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. See Unification, supra note 74, at 432 n.3.
77. See Financial Institutions and Company Law, 20 Bull. E.C. (No. 4) 29 (1987).
78. See Unification, supra note 74, at 448.
79. Revised Insider Trading Draft is Ready For Ministerial Review, 20 Sec. Reg. & L
Rep. (BNA) 1528 (Oct. 7, 1988).
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"an information exchange system among national authorities aimed at
preventing cross-border insider trading activities."80
Although this proposal will have little effect on the United Kingdom,
France, or Denmark, all of whom possess insider trading laws, those
member states lacking significant insider trading legislation will be more
dramatically affected.8" The EC's proposed Directive does not, however,
establish uniform guidelines for sanctioning convicted inside traders, and
as a result, one analyst explains, "investors will face varying levels of
deterrence in each Member State." 2 The absence of uniform penalties
undermines, to some extent, the Directive's goal of standardizing insider
trading prohibitions.8 3
2. Regulation in Canada
Unlike the centralized control over insider trading regulation evi-
denced in the United States, the authority to regulate this activity in Can-
ada has been delegated to the individual provinces. 4 Consequently,
seven of the ten provinces regulate insider trading," and these laws,
while not completely uniform, are of similar construction.86 The provin-
cial statutes provide for both civil and criminal liability. 7 Similarly, the
Canadian government may bring charges for violations of the federal
criminal code.88
Canadian regulation is twofold. First, provisions impose reporting re-
quirements for any trading activity conducted by corporate "insiders;" '89
second, Canadian law imposes liability on insiders who trade on undis-
closed material information regarding the issuer security traded. 9' An
insider is a director, senior officer, or anyone else who exerts control over
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Unification, supra note 74, at 449.
83. See id.
84. British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., ch. 3, § 92(11); see also the Canada
Business Corporations Act, Can. Bus. Corp. Act, ch. 44, §§ 126-29 (1974-76) (regulates,
however, the incorporation of federal companies and contains a provision regarding in-
sider trading in this particular area).
85. For Ontario's insider trading statute to apply, an issuer's securities must be either
listed on its stock exchange or registered for sale in the province. See 10 H. Bloomenthal
& S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 1.08[5][e], at 1-127. For insider trading laws to apply in
every other province, a corporation must have listed its securities on that province's ex-
change, must have publicly distributed shares in that province before, and must have
shareholders of record with addresses within that province. See id. In light of these
requirements, it is entirely possible for the laws of more than one province to apply to a
single issuer.
86. See id. § 108[5][e], at 1-127.
87. See Cowan, Canada, in 10A International Capital Markets and Securities Regula-
tion § 4.13, at 4-81 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1991).
88. See id.
89. See id. § 4.08, at 4-54. United States regulation also includes specific reporting
requirements for trading by corporate insiders. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-6 (1991).
90. 10A Cowan, supra note 87, § 4.08, at 4-54.
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more than ten percent of equity shares. 9' Liability also extends to tip-
pees, but in this respect the individual provinces differ. Compare the
laws of Ontario and Quebec-in Ontario, a tippee must be in a "special
relationship" with the issuer to be held liable, while in Quebec tippee
liability extends to anyone "who knowingly possesses nonpublic informa-
tion trading." '9 2
3. Regulation in Australia
Detailed regulation of insider trading in Australia is embodied in the
Securities Industry Act,93 which has been adopted by every state. The
Code makes it illegal "for a person associated with a corporation to deal
in its securities on the basis of nonpublic, materially price sensitive infor-
mation obtained as a result of that association."' It is also unlawful for
a connected person to tip others and for a tippee to trade on such infor-
mation when he knows it came from a connected person." Violations
are punishable by both civil and criminal penalties. 96
Despite its thorough provisions, the Security Industry Act has not
only proved ineffective but has also failed to result in a single insider
trading conviction.97 As a result, Australia is enacting legislation which
is designed to stiffen the penalties.9" Furthermore, the newly created
Australian Securities Commission is gathering substantial resources to
better enforce the existing regulations. 9
4. Regulation in Asia
Japanese insider trading legislation,"oo embodied in the Securities and
Exchange Law,101 is essentially modeled after the United States laws.
Yet Article 58, the general anti-fraud statute modeled after Rule lOb-5,
fails to expressly criminalize insider trading and therefore has been
91. See id § 4.08, at 4-54.
92. Bornstein & Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 375, 395 [hereinafter International Regulation] (citing Ontario Securities
Act, §§ 131(1)-(2), 131(4), 131(7) and Quebec Securities Act § 189).
93. See Securities Industry Act, Austl. Acts P., No. 66, § 128 (1980).
94. 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 1.0851[fl, at 1-129 to 1-130.
95. See Securities Industry Act, supra note 93, §§ 128(3),(4).
96. A draft of proposed new legislation in Australia states that the new law "should
make clear that a criminal conviction for insider trading is not a prerequisite to a person
obtaining a civil remedy against the person who engaged in or was involved in the insider
trading." Australian Insider Trading Bill to be Introduced in Parliament Soon, 23 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 771, 772 (May 17, 1991) [hereinafter Australian Bill]; see infra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
97. See Australian Bill, supra note 96, at 771.
98. See i.
99. See id at 772.
100. See Note, Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforement, in Annual
Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the
1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S255, S255-63 (1992).
101. See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948, No. 25 (1948) (Japan).
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deemed too general to be used to prosecute insider trading. 10 2 Article
189, modeled after Section 16(b) of United States law, requires that
short-swing trading profits made by corporate insiders be turned over to
the company issuer, " but the effectiveness of Article 189 was severely
limited by the repeal of Japan's reporting requirements.l" Japan's devel-
opment into an economic leader, coupled with the expansion of its secur-
ities market, has led to increasing pressure (particularly from the United
States) to strengthen insider trading regulation. 05 In addition, recent
insider trading scandals in Japan have sparked greater recognition of the
need for increased regulation by the Japanese Ministry of Finance
("MF"). °6 In April 1989, the MF adopted more stringent penalties for
insider trading violations, including imprisonment and fines.' 0 7 Never-
theless, the limited resources of the MF 08 and the history of relaxed
rules in this area will likely delay the effectiveness of this legislation in
Japan. 1 9
In Hong Kong, insider trading activity was first criminalized by Sec-
tion 140 of the 1974 Securities Ordinance. This initial statute was never
enforced, however, and this particular' 0 Section was repealed in 1978
with the enactment of Part XIIA.11
Rather than providing for criminal or civil punishment, the 1978 pro-
vision penalizes an offender by publicizing the findings of the "Insider
Dealing Tribunal," the body charged with investigating suspected viola-
tors." 2 Publication follows a thorough Tribunal inquiry and details the
Tribunal's findings, in which the subject of the inquiry is either exoner-
ated or inculpated in the Tribunal's report." 3 This unique regulatory
102. See Oda, Japan Moves Against Insider Trading, Fin. Times, June 2, 1988, § 1, at
10 [hereinafter Japan Moves].
103. See L. Loss, M. Yazawa & B. Banoff, Japanese Securities Regulation 38 (1983).
104. See Grass, Internationalization of the Securities Trading Markets, 9 Hous. J. Int'l
L. 17, 48 (1986) [hereinafter Trading Markets].
105. See Japanese Insider Trading Law Likely To Take Effect in 1989, 20 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 881 (June 10, 1988) [hereinafter Japanese Insider Trading] (discussing
proposed amendments to Japan's securities laws being enacted to crack down on insider
trading activity).
106. See Oda, Japan Moves, supra note 102, at 10. In 1987, a bank sold all of its shares
of Tateho Chemical Company just before this company announced heavy losses. See id.
Following this incident the MF "recommended a number of measures to deal with insider
trading including the adoption of a statute specifically making insider trading unlawful."
H. Blcomenthal & Holme Roberts & Owen, Emerging Trends in Securities Law § 10.04,
at 10-20 (1989) [hereinafter Emerging Trends].
107. See Japanese Insider Trading, supra note 105, at 881.
108. See Investment Banks, Bus. Int'l; Financing Foreign Operations (March 1, 1991),
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Japan File.
109. See Wagstyl, Tokyo SE Reticence on Insider Deal Casts Doubt on Reforms, Fin.
Times, Aug. 27, 1988, § I, at 20.
110. See Rogers, Hong Kong, in 10B International Capital Markets and Securities Reg-
ulation § 12.12[l][a], at 12-118 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1991).
111. See id. § 12.12[l][b], at 12-119.
112. See id. § 12.12[2][a], at 12-120.
113. Culpable insider trading under this provision is defined as trading conducted by a
S330 [Vol. 60
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
system, however, has had little success deterring inside trading activ-
ity.114 Debate in Hong Kong continues as to whether this should be con-
sidered a criminal or civil offense and whether more traditional sanctions
should attach.' 15
5. Other Developments
Switzerland recently criminalized insider trading activity,'1 6 and pro-
posals for legislation in other countries continue to develop.'t 7 Major
insider trading prohibitions may be enacted over the next few years as
the internationalization of the world's securities markets continues and
pressure increases from those nations with substantial regulations."'
C. Comparison of Central Aspects of Regulation
The United States has the most comprehensive system of regulating
insider trading activity, and these regulations have served as a model for
many foreign insider trading prohibitions." 9 Even slight variations from
the United States model, however, can have a marked effect on the appli-
cability of insider trading laws.' 20 In addition, national philosophies, as
well as a country's allocation of resources to combat this conduct, deter-
mine the extent to which securities laws violations-and in turn, insider
connected person, or by one who is tipped by a connected person, based on "'relevant
information' concerning those securities." Id. § 12.12[2][b][i], at 12-120. A connected
person is a "director, employee or 'substantial shareholder" of the corporation whose
shares are traded or of any "'related corporation' ". 10B Rogers, supra note 110,
§ 12.12[2][b][iii), at 12-121. Information that is nonpublic and materially price sensitive
constitutes relevant information under this provision. See id § 1.12[21[b][ii], at 12-121.
Culpability under this regulation also requires that the securities traded were listed on
the Hong Kong stock exchange at the time of the trading or within the preceding five
years. See id § 12.1212][b][iv], at 12-122.
114. See 10B Rogers, supra note 110, § 12.12[3][a], at 12-128.
115. See Trading Procedures, Bus. Int'l; Financing Foreign Operations (Dec. 1, 1990),
available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, HKong File.
116. See SEC Has Sought Enforcement Help Under Swiss Treaty, Attorney Says, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1294 (Aug. 19, 1988); see also Emerging Trends, supra note
106, § 10.04, at 10-23 (effective July 1, 1988, the Swiss law applies to insiders, tippers and
tippees).
117. For a discussion of proposed insider trading regulations in the Netherlands,
Belgium and Ireland, see Unification, supra note 74, at 444-45.
118. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1386.
119. See Japan's Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 101, art. 189. The Law
prohibits short-swing trading by high level, specified insiders, modeled after Section 16(b)
of United States' '34 Act. In addition, the SEC inspired the creation of the French securi-
ties regulatory agency, the Commission des Operations de la Bourse. See Tunc, A French
Lawyer Looks at American Corporations Law and Securities Regulation, 130 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 757, 759 (1982).
120. For example, in the United Kingdom, to be subject to the insider trading prohibi-
tions, persons "must have some direct connection with the issuer". Trading Markets,
supra note 104, at 47. Alternatively, under American law, where there must be a fiduci-
ary obligation to be bound by the regulations, less of an issue is made over the direct link
between issuer and trader. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. This distinc-
tion, while seemingly minimal, may enable the United States laws to enjoy greater utility.
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trading activities, are sanctioned in individual nations.12 Following is a
review of central aspects of United States and foreign insider trading
regulations.
1. Criminal v. Civil Liability
Statutes which include civil liability generally require lesser standards
of proof than those that impose criminal liability.1 22 For this reason,
countries that enact civil provisions against insider trading should have
more success in effectively punishing violators than those who impose
purely criminal sanctions.
United States regulation is unique in that it developed predominantly
from a general criminal anti-fraud statute.1 23 Today, however, violators
in the United States are subject to both criminal and civil penalties.' 24
Similarly, the United Kingdom, France, and Denmark began their regu-
lation by criminalizing insider trading.1 25 But of these three, only the
United Kingdom has followed the United States in imposing civil liabil-
ity as well.1 26 The EC Directive on insider trading, effective in 1992, fails
to establish any uniform sanctions for the member states. 127
Like those in the United Kingdom and the United States, Canadian
provincial laws impose both civil and criminal penalties for insider trad-
ing violations.' 21 Sanctions in Canada may be imposed by civil codes or
provincial legislation, and these are augmented by the federal criminal
code.1 29 The Australian National Code, which has been adopted by all
of its states, similarly imposes both criminal and civil liability. 130
Although Japan enacted an anti-fraud statute modeled after Rule lOb-
5, this initial provision was not enforced because the MF was reluctant to
121. See Global Securities Market, supra note 1, at 306.
122. "[A] criminal statute is to be strictly construed and cannot be used as the flexible
tool needed to check the range of possible [trading] transactions." 10A Miller, supra note
68, § 7.16[l], at 7-37.
123. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Rather than following this approach,
most nations have instead enacted laws specially dealing with insider trading.
124. For an in-depth discussion on the prosecution of insider trading cases and the
criminal and civil sanctions available under United States law, see D. Langevoort, supra
note 12, at 199-239.
125. See supra notes 56-59, 66-67, 73-74 and accompanying text.
126. See Comparative Analysis, supra note 40, at 182.
127. See supra text accompanying note 82. The EC Directive sets only general mini-
mum standards for insider trading regulation. The enactment of more specific prohibi-
tions and sanctions remains within the authority of the individual nations. See Note,
Insider Trading and the EEC: Harmonization of the Insider Trading Laws of the Member
States, 8 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 151, 169 (1985) [hereinafter Laws of the Member
States].
128. See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. 466, § 118(1) (1980) (Can.) (makes violating
insider trading prohibitions a crime).
129. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also H. L. Ffrench, International
Law of Take-Overs and Mergers: Asia, Australia and Oceania 358 (1986) (discussing
Section 128 of the Securities Industry Act of 1980; Act provides for civil relief to those
hurt by insider dealing and makes this activity a crime).
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prosecute absent express language criminalizing insider trading.' 3 Ja-
pan has since amended its laws to include more specific prohibitions, and
the law now explicitly imposes criminal penalties for insider trading vio-
lations.132 Hong Kong does not subject insider traders to either civil or
criminal penalties. Instead, as discussed, punishment is in the form of
publication of the violator's culpability in an official report.'
33
Pursuant to the aforementioned French, Danish, and Japanese
prohibitions, the agency charged with prosecuting insider trading of-
fenses in these countries is faced with the difficult burden of establishing
each element of a criminal offense before sanctions are available. This
requirement severely hampers the effectiveness of these regulations." 4
Uniform establishment of civil liability for insider trading activity would
assist the international enforcement of insider trading laws in these
nations.
2. Who Are "Insiders?"
The inclusion or absence of a specific definition for "insiders" in
prohibitions of insider trading is the second element that appears to have
substantial impact on the effectiveness of insider trading laws. Failure to
provide even a general framework for defining insiders may result in a
provision too broad to provide effective regulation, as enforcers may be
reluctant to subject anyone to liability. Conversely, a strict definition of
insiders may impede enforcement efforts by making it difficult to fit po-
tential violators into the rigid classification required under the law.'
35
Regulations in the United States do not contain a precise definition of
"insiders." 136 Rather than hindering enforcement, however, the absence
of a strict definition has instead allowed broad extensions of liability for
insider trading.1 37 In the United States, the notion has developed that
insiders are, at a minimum, those who have a fiduciary duty to either
disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from trading.1 38 This
131. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also H.L. Ffrench, supra note 130,
at 22 (stating Article 58 of Securities and Exchange Law has not been applied to insider
trading cases).
132. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also Comparative Analysis, supra
note 40, at 188-89 (discussing 1988 proposal to amend Japan's law).
133. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 69,74 and accompanying text. While prohibitions making insider
trading a crime may have an adverse effect on the ability to obtain convictions, it is also
true that creation of criminal liability is a positive step towards enforcement in countries
where insider trading was previously subject to no restrictions at all.
135. As one author explains, by providing an express definition of insider trading the
United Kingdom has created "a more restrictive application of the law." Comparative
Analysis, supra note 40, at 191.
136. See id at 178, discussing Congress's intentional failure to include a definition in
1988 insider trading statute.
137. The absence of a definition for insider trading has led to "expansive interpretation
by the courts of impermissible insider trading conduct (and] has enabled the SEC to
successfdly prosecute an increasing number of violators." Id at 179.
138. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. "The fiduciary principle, however,
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fiduciary duty has also been extended to "temporary insiders" and tip-
pees. 1 39 Similarly, the EC Directive adopts a moderate definition, en-
compassing both fiduciaries and tippees,'" to avoid either a very limited
or an over-broad construction. In Australia, insiders are those associated
with a securities issuer who learn of the subject information through this
association."' Identical in most respects to the United Kingdom's laws,
the Australian Code emulates United States law in that it expressly in-
cludes as insiders shareholders of more than ten percent of a company's
stock.142 Tippees who receive the information from an associated person
are also insiders under the Code. 4 1 Japan's new criminal insider trading
provision creates three categories of insiders. These are: the corporate
insiders, quasi-insiders (including attorneys, brokers, and others), and
public officials who have access to inside information.144 Hong Kong's
provisions also require that, in order to justify an investigation, the trad-
ing must have been done by a connected person or by one who received a
tip from such connected person.
145
The insider trading laws of the United Kingdom mandate strict adher-
ence to a theory of liability premised on one's status as a "connected
person." 146 This theory is also applicable to tippees who receive informa-
tion from connected persons. 147 By requiring a direct link between the
trader and issuer, this approach is more narrow than those of the other
nations and thus is more limited in its application.
An interesting distinction exists between the laws of the Canadian
provinces Ontario and Quebec with respect to the characterization of tip-
pees as insiders. In Ontario, tippees are subject to liability as insiders
only if they are in a "special relationship" with the issuer as defined in its
statute. 148 Pursuant to Quebec's statute, however, insiders include any
corporate outsider who trades on what he knows is inside information. 149
is by no means rigid or inflexible; it leaves room for creative interpretation that allows a
court so inclined to expand its scope in accord with perceptions about fairness in the
securities marketplace." D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 58.
139. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. There is also a possibility that this
common-law definition of insiders extends to those who misappropriate this information.
See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
140. See supra text accompanying note 78.
141. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. This connected status applies to any
person in a position "that may reasonably be expected to give him access to the [requisite]
information by reason of a professional or business relationship existing between himself
and the company or a related company." H.L. Ffrench, supra note 130, at 359.
142. See Hambrook, Australia, in 10B International Capital Markets and Securities
Regulation § 10.09[2], at 10-50-51 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1991).
143. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
144. See 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 1.08[5][g], at 1-132.
145. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also H.L. Ffrench, supra note 130,
at 61 (insiders must have a connection to subject corporation within six months prior to
the illegal trading).
146. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
148. See Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. 466, § 131(1) (1980) (Can.).
149. See Securities Act, R.S.Q., ch. 48, § 189(5) (1982) (Can.).
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France, in contrast, has a much broader definition of insiders than do
these nations. 5° Insiders include the traditional high-level corporate in-
siders as well as a broad second category consisting of anyone else who
obtains the information during the course of his employment151 Insider
trading laws in Denmark, though, do not differentiate between insiders
and outsiders.15 2
While most of these foreign statutes are newly enacted and/or little
used as of yet, the broad meaning they apply to insiders provides at least
the potential for their application to a wide variety of situations. The
meaning applied under French law allows for especially great applicabil-
ity, while the United Kingdom's standard may limit the utility of its
otherwise comprehensive regulations.
3. Defining "Inside Information"
Like the definitions of insiders, statutory definitions of inside informa-
tion can have a profound effect on the applicability and effectiveness of
insider trading regulations.
United States law fails to include a specific definition of inside informa-
tion in Rule 10(b), its original and primary weapon against insider trad-
ing.'53 Later provisions, however, establish that insider information
consists of "material, nonpublic information."'" This construction of
inside information provides enough of a framework for imposing liabil-
ity, but remains broad enough to allow wide application. The United
Kingdom restricts this definition only slightly by requiring that inside
information be unpublished, specific information likely to materially af-
fect the market price of the security.5 Australian law echoes this defini-
tion."5 6 The EC Directive on insider trading includes a corresponding
definition of inside information, defining it as nonpublic information that
would have significant impact on the price of the security if it were made
public.'57 Japan's statute provides a broad range of matters to which
nonpublic information must refer in order to qualify as inside informa-
150. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. Other aspects of the French law, how-
ever, prevent the broad application of this statute that appears to be available in light of
this definition. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Note, however, that this language does
not expressly extend the French definition of insiders to tippees who do not learn the
information through their employment. See Laws of the Member States, supra note 127,
at 171.
152. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
153. See '34 Act, supra note 6, § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1988)).
154. See Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); see also TSC Industries
Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (materiality refers to information regarding a
security that a reasonable investor would consider important).
155. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
157. See Dawkins, EEC Proposes Action On Insider Dealing, Fin. Times, Apr. 29,
1987, § 1, at 48, col. 1.
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tion,"5 s and Denmark's statute very generally refers to all nonpublic
information. 159
In contrast, the meaning given to inside information in France is far
narrower. The information must be "precise, special and certain" and
must refer to either "technical, commercial or financial" aspects of the
issuer. 160
Inside information under Ontario law is defined as information that is
price-sensitive due to knowledge of a material fact or a material change
in relation to the issuer. 161 The remaining Canadian provinces define in-
side information simply as undisclosed material information. 162
Definitions applied to inside information in these nations are, again,
for the most part uniform in that they refer to nonpublic, price-sensitive
information. 163 France's specialized definition, however, serves as a re-
straint on the applicability of its insider trading laws, as may Ontario's
definition, to a lesser extent. 16 The EC Directive, described above, does
not define inside information as strictly as the French law. 165 This omis-
sion should give securities authorities subject to the insider trading provi-
sion greater flexibility in bringing insider trading charges.
4. Type of Securities Regulated
The effectiveness of insider trading statutes may be hindered if they are
made applicable only to securities that are traded on a formal, organized
exchange. France, Denmark, and the Canadian provinces each place this
restriction on the application of their laws. 166 United States regulations,
again, are widely applicable to securities traded both on or off an ex-
change,167 and the EC Directive applies to trading of both listed securi-
ties and off-market transactions. 16  With off-market trading activity on
the rise, application of insider trading regulations to informal exchanges
becomes increasingly important.
158. See Japan Moves, supra note 102, at 10.
159. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. In one case, the Paris Court held
that knowledge of rumors did not qualify as inside information under the law. See Laws
of the Member States, supra note 127, at 173 (citing Judgement of May 26, 1977, Cour
d'appel Paris, 1978, J.C.P. II No. 18,789).
161. See 10 H. Bloomenthal & S. Wolff, supra note 46, § 1.08[5][e], at 1-128.
162. See id
163. See supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
164. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 67, 74, 85 and accompanying text. The United Kingdom's prohi-
bition of off-market trading is the primary reason it is viewed as having the most compre-
hensive insider trading regulations of the EC member nations. See Laws of the Member
States, supra note 127, at 176-77.
167. See '34 Act, supra note 6, § 2, 48 Stat. at 885 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988)).
168. See Unification, supra note 74, at 437.
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5. Enforcement of Regulations
The adoption of more severe insider trading regulations, without an
underlying dedication to the enforcement of these provisions, is not
enough to mount a substantial attack on insider trading. Whatever the
elements of substantive insider trading regulations, these laws will only
be effective in combatting this illegal conduct if they are enforced by na-
tional governments and/or regulatory agencies. A country's national
philosophy regarding insider trading plays a substantial role in the extent
to which illegal trading regulations are enforced. 69
For example, despite the structural similarities between Japan's Securi-
ties Exchange Law and the United States insider trading regulations,
only extremely limited action has been taken pursuant to the Japanese
law, 11° in contrast to the widespread application of the United States
law.171 This is primarily due to the fact that the Japanese virtually sanc-
tioned insider trading activity until very recently." 2 Even with the
newly enacted changes in Japanese law, this underlying philosophy may
remain an obstacle to effective enforcement of illegal trading.'73 Hong
Kong's reluctance to enact traditional civil and criminal laws prohibiting
insider trading is also attributable to the national government's underly-
ing acceptance of this conduct as a natural part of securities trading.'7 4
There has been only one Tribunal Report issued in Hong Kong since the
enactment of Part XIIA, and this report was issued more than two years
after the alleged insider trading occurred.' 75 Until these countries make
curbing insider trading a national priority and change their enforcement
policies, they cannot successfully deter this activity.
Limited availability of resources to regulatory authorities provides an
additional obstacle to thorough enforcement of insider trading laws.' 76
Moreover, jurisdictional barriers often inhibit the enforcement efforts of
regulatory authorities. 177 This is increasingly true due to the growing
169. See infra notes 170, 172 and accompanying text.
170. See L. Loss, M. Yazawa & B. Banoff, supra note 103, at 192.
171. See supra notes 6-51 and accompanying text.
172. See L. Loss, M. Yazawa & B. Banoff, supra note 103, at 192.
173. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; see also Comparative Analysis, supra
note 40, at 189 nn.1l1-12 (insider trading is socially acceptable and common behavior in
Japan).
174. See supra text accompanying note 110.
175. See lOB Rogers, supra note 110, § 12.12[3], at 12-128. In addition, "no transac-
tion is void or voidable by reason of its being an insider dealing." IL. Ffrench, supra
note 130, at 62.
176. See, eg., Government, Not SIB, Urged To Enforce British Securities Regulatory
Scheme, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1846-47 (Dec. 4, 1987) (discussing an argument
that the British Securities Investigations Board, which has authority to bring prosecu-
tions, should not be the body charged with this responsibility due to its lack of commit-
ment to the enforcement of British securities laws and due to the dearth of junior
investigators available to look into insider trading activity).
177. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. In the past, French and British insider
trading investigations have been hampered by the alleged violators' use of foreign banks
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number of insider trading cases that entail extraterritorial elements.' 8
PART II: INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING
LAWS
A. Introduction
Technological advances have enabled the trading of United States se-
curities to take place outside of the country.1"9 As a result, much of
today's illegal trading of American securities is facilitated by the use of
foreign brokers and institutions."s Both Dennis Levine and Ivan Bo-
esky, for example, utilized foreign bank accounts to aid their illegal
trading. 181
As discussed, United States law is by far the most comprehensive. In-
deed, many countries have yet to impose substantial insider trading laws
at all. Absent the enactment of uniform prohibitions of this activity
worldwide, an event which is not likely to occur soon, if ever,18 2 some
traders will take advantage of the discrepancies by trading outside of
those nations imposing harsh penalties. 8 a Therefore, despite existing ju-
risdictional and extraterritorial discovery limitations, international appli-
cation of United States insider trading laws is essential to maintaining
control over illegal insider trading activity."8
for the trading activity. See Cruickshank, Insider Trading and the EEC, 10 Int'l Bus. L.
345, 346 (1982).
178. This is the greatest obstacle faced by the SEC in its enforcement efforts. For an
in-depth discussion of these barriers and the methods used by the SEC to overcome them,
see infra notes 186-267 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
180. See D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 25.
181. See Wall Street Rogues; Where are they Now?, USA Today, Nov. 23, 1990, at 3B.
"The Boesky, Dennis Levine and other high profile cases heightened the need for the SEC
to develop an enforcement program that could directly attack violations by U.S. citizens
in foreign countries and by non-U.S. persons acting overseas, whose activities signifi-
cantly affected the U.S. securities markets or U.S. investors." SEC's Enforcement Pro-
gram, supra note 2, at 1376.
182. See, e.g., Global Securities Market, supra note 1, at 306 (citing the cost of adopting
uniform regulations, in addition to the varying national market structures and philoso-
phies, as major obstacles to the enactment of uniform regulations worldwide).
183. See D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 25.
184. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1376. This section of the Note
focuses on the extension of United States insider trading laws beyond its own national
borders. This extension results from the fact that the SEC, more than any other national
securities regulatory agency, has increasingly attempted to apply its regulations extrater-
ritorially. See Emerging Trends, supra note 106, § 10.04, at 10-22; see also infra notes
224-33 and accompanying text (discussing bilateral and multilateral cooperative agree-
ments entered into by the SEC to facilitate extraterritorial application of United States
securities laws).
The internationalization of the securities markets, however, has affected trading not
only in the United States but worldwide. An overwhelming amount of foreign exchange
trading takes place on the London market. In addition, a number of foreign companies
are listed on the London and Tokyo Exchanges. See Global Securities Market, supra note
I, at 303 & n. 1.
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B. Jurisdictional Barriers to International Enforcement
The United States Constitution requires that minimum standards be
met before a United States federal court can acquire personal jurisdiction
over an individual and subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy.
Acquisition of personal jurisdiction must meet the standards of the Due
Process Clause,"'5 and subject matter jurisdiction can only be extended if
it has been authorized by Article III and Congress.18 6
1. Acquiring Personal Jurisdiction
Questions of personal jurisdiction are raised when the SEC attempts to
investigate or prosecute insider trading involving either foreign partici-
pants or foreign witnesses.' 87 The Supreme Court has held that, in ac-
quiring personal jurisdiction over a foreigner, due process requires that it
be in keeping with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."1 This criterion is satisfied when there has been a finding of suffi-
cient "minimum contacts" between the foreign subject and the United
States. 189
The Supreme Court's interpretation severely limits the ability of a for-
eigner to defeat an SEC effort to bring him into a United States court.
The Court's criteria will likely be satisfied by any continuous trading of
United States securities, any trading conducted through United States
accounts, or even by a single act that is directly related to the SEC's
claim.19°
2. Acquiring Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that its
provisions "provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of
over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce
and through the mails."' 19 1 Based upon an interpretation of this lan-
guage, two tests have developed as the basis to establish subject matter
jurisdiction in cases with extraterritorial elements: the "conduct" test
and "effects" test.
Pursuant to the "conduct" test, a court will examine where the activi-
ties occurred and will determine whether the activity taking place in the
185. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
186. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
187. See Mann & Mar, Current Issues in International Securities Law Enforcement, in
P.L.I. International Securities Markets 1 (Aug. 22, 1988) [hereinafter Current Issues].
188. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)(quoting In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
189. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
190. See, eg., SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987)(acquiring personal jurisdic-
tion over Tome, a foreign citizen who traded United States stock through foreign brokers
but had other contacts with the United States unrelated to the trading activity), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988).
191. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
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United States is substantial in relation to the overall conduct. 92 In
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 9 ' for example, the
Second Circuit found jurisdiction under the conduct test. The court held
that "abundant misrepresentations" made to an American citizen in the
United States constituted substantial conduct even where the remainder
of the activities transpired abroad.'94 In a more recent case applying the
conduct test, the SEC asserted jurisdiction where a foreigner traded on a
foreign exchange through United States accounts on the theory that
there was a substantial impact on the United States domestic market. 95
The second test utilized to assert subject matter jurisdiction is the "ef-
fects" test. Application of this test requires an examination of the impact
that the activities in question, all of which may have occurred abroad,
have had in the United States. Where the effect is found to have been
significant, jurisdiction may be extended. 196 The first case that applied
the "effects" test was Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.197 In Schoenbaum, the
Second Circuit asserted jurisdiction despite the fact that the conduct oc-
curred outside of the United States and involved foreign investors.' 9
Apparently, the rationale was that the trading of United States securities
was held to have injured United States investors. 199 In addition, the Sev-
enth Circuit has applied the "effects" test by examining the foreign con-
duct to determine if it "caused foreseeable and substantial harm to
interests in the United States. ' '2°°
There are limitations on the extension of jurisdiction under these two
tests. In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., for instance, the Second Circuit
held that conduct that is "merely preparatory" does not constitute sub-
stantial conduct where the majority of activity occurs abroad.20 1 Also,
the mere involvement of a United States citizen is not enough to confer
subject matter jurisdiction.2 2 Despite these limitations, these tests ap-
pear to permit United States courts broad exercise of subject matter juris-
diction over potential violators operating abroad.
C. Extraterritorial Discovery
United States securities laws give the SEC authority to investigate and
192. See Haseltine, International Regulation of Securities Markets: Interaction Be-
tween United States and Foreign Laws, 36 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 307, 319 (1987) [hereinafter
Interaction].
193. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
194. Id. at 1339.
195. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1383.
196. See Interaction, supra note 192, at 321-22.
197. 405 F.2d 200, 206, rev'don other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
198. See id. 206.
199. See id.
200. Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984).
201. 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
202. See id.
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subpoena witnesses "from any place in the United States." °3 United
States courts have, in turn, interpreted this language to authorize extra-
territorial discovery as long as jurisdictional requirements are met.'
Foreign opposition to this extraterritorial discovery exists, however, and
is embodied in statutory restrictions on the release of information. As a
result, "[t]he principal problem the SEC confronts in its efforts to police
the internationalized U.S. securities markets is obtaining information
that is located outside U.S. borders .. ."'
1. Foreign Secrecy and Blocking Laws
A significant barrier to extraterritorial enforcement of United States
insider trading laws surfaces when an SEC subpoena or request for infor-
mation conflicts with foreign secrecy or blocking laws.'
Some nations have adopted blocking laws requiring specified informa-
tion to remain confidential in order to protect national interests.2 °
These statutes safeguard national interests, and thus "private parties to a
lawsuit lack the power to waive prohibitions against disclosure.""2°a Can-
ada, France, and the United Kingdom are among the nations that have
enacted blocking statutes.' 9
Bank secrecy laws make it illegal for a foreign bank to disclose infor-
mation about its bank records without the customer's authorization. 210
Secrecy laws may be waived by individual customers provided that this
does not prejudice the rights of third parties to whom the bank owes a
duty of secrecy. 21I Application of these laws can frustrate an SEC at-
tempt to gain access to information that may be vital to an insider trad-
ing case.
2 12
2. Unilateral Attempts to Obtain Discovery
Faced with a foreign secrecy or blocking law, the SEC may resort to
203. 15 U.S.C. 78u(b) (1988).
204. See, eg., SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1945) (holding as
long as a subpoena has been properly executed in the United States, it may be used to
acquire discovery material outside of the country).
205. Current Issues, supra note 187, at 1.
206. See id. at 9-10.
207. See id at 50.
208. International Regulation, supra note 92, at 410 (footnote omitted).
209. See Current Issues, supra note 187, at 50-53. France's blocking statute automati-
cally "prohibits the disclosure of certain economic, commercial, financial or other types
of information to foreign authorities." Interaction, supra note 192, at 313. The Canadian
and United Kingdom blocking statutes authorize designated officials to prohibit the dis-
closure of specified information but, unlike the French statute, do not operate automati-
cally to block disclosure. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 1984-1985, ch. 49,
§ 3; Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11, § 1(3).
210. See The Bahamas Banks and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment) Act,
1980. See generally Hurd, Insider Trading and Foreign Bank Secrecy, 24 Am. Bus. LJ.
25 (1986) (discussing the effects of these statutes on insider trading regulation).
211. International Regulation, supra note 92, at 410-I1.
212. See Current Issues, supra note 187, at 53.
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United States courts to compel production of the requested information
pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 213  A
court's decision to grant or deny an order to compel will often be based
on consideration of the factors listed in Section 40 of the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.214 Focusing on
international comity considerations, the criteria under the Restatement
include: (a) the national interests of each country; (b) the hardship of
inconsistent enforcement upon the individual; (c) the extent of the con-
duct in the foreign nation; (d) the nationality of the individual-involved;
and (e) the extent to which compliance will be achieved through
enforcement.215
Generally, United States courts have ordered motions to compel based
on an analysis of these factors. In the landmark case SEC v. Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana ("BSP"),216 the court held that BSI could not use Swiss
secrecy laws to avoid disclosure and application of United States insider
trading laws. 217 In another case, the Supreme Court introduced a second
balancing test focusing on the first factor in Section 40.2 18 This test
merely weighs the importance of the requested discovery material against
the interests of each nation.21 9 The Court developed this test from Sec-
tion 437(1)(c) of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law but did
not state whether the analysis should be exclusive.220
Use of a unilateral approach to achieve compliance with United States
law, such as court-ordered compliance, is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, the court might not order compliance with United States
law.221 More likely, an order to compel may be ignored where compli-
ance will subject a foreign institution to civil and criminal penalties in its
213. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; see Note, Court Ordered Violations of Foreign Bank Secrecy
and Blocking Laws: Solving the Extraterritorial Dilemma, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 563, 577-
82. See generally D. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 29 (discussion on motions to compel).
214. See Current Issues, supra note 187, at 31 (citing Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 40 (1965)).
215. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 40
(1965).
216. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
217. Following BSI's refusal to reveal the names of its customers, the SEC moved for a
motion to compel. BSI argued that the motion should be denied because BSI would be
subject to civil and criminal penalties in Switzerland if it made these disclosures. In
granting the SEC's motion, the court stated that "a foreign law's prohibition of discovery
is not decisive" on this issue. Id at 114; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings v. Bank of
Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 829 (11th Cir. 1984) (concluding under analysis of Rest. § 40
that United States interests in getting discovery information outweighed those of the Cay-
man Islands in retaining bank secrecy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
218. See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct, S.D.
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
219. See id at 543-44.
220. See id. at 544 n.28.
221. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing contempt
order against bank for refusal to respond to grand jury subpoena emphasizing that bank
had acted in good faith throughout the proceedings), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987).
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own country.2" Finally, as experts have noted, "this unilateral approach
[is] time consuming, expensive[,] and strain[s] international relations."'
D. Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperative Approaches to International
Enforcement
Bilateral and multilateral approaches, consisting primarily of coopera-
tive agreements between the United States and foreign countries, are a
far better method for conducting successful extraterritorial investigations
and promoting transnational enforcement of insider trading regula-
tions.' 4 Cooperative agreements have increasingly become the SEC's
method of choice for facilitating international enforcement of insider
trading regulations." 5 These agreements provide methods for successful
extraterritorial discovery by enabling the SEC to work around foreign
secrecy and blocking statutes." 6 At the same time, SEC action under
these agreements comports with notions of international comity by pro-
moting cooperative regulatory efforts as opposed to forced regulation. z'
The two forms of international cooperative agreements that are used to
conduct insider trading investigations and prosecutions are (1) mutual
legal assistance treaties for the production of evidence in criminal mat-
ters; and (2) memoranda of understanding. Finally, legislative initiatives
promoting international cooperation, in addition to meetings between na-
tional securities regulators, provide the opportunity for international
communication and cooperation regarding worldwide regulation of se-
curities trading.
1. Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
The United States has entered into bilateral treaties regarding mutual
legal assistance in criminal matters with Switzerland," 8 the Nether-
lands," 9 Turkey,2 3 ° the Cayman Islands," 1 and Italy.232 Treaties with
222. "The Swiss penal Code provides sanctions for persons associated with banks who
breach client confidentiality" in violation of its secrecy law. Current Issues, supra note
187, at 53.
223. Id. at 1.
224. See Interaction, supra note 192, at 309. A cooperative approach towards interna-
tional enforcement of insider trading is preferable to unilateral action because it can bet-
ter accommodate the different levels of regulatory control existing worldwide. See id.
For example, unilateral pressure to enforce strict insider trading laws in countries with
less-developed regulatory structures could stifle the development of these nations' domes-
tic markets. See id.
225. SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1386.
226. See id
227. See id
228. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switm, 27
U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter the Swiss Treaty]. For a detailed analysis of
the Swiss Treaty, see Current Issues, supra note 187, at 54-63.
229. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12, 1981, U.S.-
Neth., 21 I.L.M. 48, T.I.A.S. No. 10734 [hereinafter the Netherlands Treaty].
230. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979,
U.S.-Turk., 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891.
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Columbia, Morocco, Canada, the Bahamas, Belgium, Mexico, and Thai-
land have been negotiated but have not yet been ratified by both
countries.233
The SEC has ensured that each of these treaties covers securities law
offenses.23 4 Pursuant to the treaties, the SEC and the respective foreign
regulator agree to provide assistance in the production of evidence for
criminal investigations, including insider trading. The Swiss Treaty, for
example, "'provides for broad assistance in ... criminal matters ...
includ[ing] assistance in locating witnesses, obtaining statements and tes-
timony of witnesses, production and authentication of business records,
and service of judicial or administrative documents.' ,235
The principal shortcoming of such treaties, however, is their bilateral
nature, which limits their availability to the two named nations. 236 A
second limitation of many of the treaties is the requirement that the sub-
ject matter of the request for assistance be a crime in both nations.237
This is a particularly significant obstacle to obtaining meaningful cooper-
ation in insider trading investigations because the United States has
promulgated more developed insider trading laws than other nations.
Mutual assistance treaties also tend to have a limited scope, and their
bureaucratic nature often makes obtaining compliance too time-consum-
ing to offer much help.238
2. Memoranda of Understanding
In an effort to create a less formalized and therefore more expeditious
method of obtaining assistance in these cases, the SEC has entered into
Memoranda of Understanding ("MOUs") with the appropriate authori-
ties of foreign countries.239 These MOUs promote mutual exchange of
the information needed for the investigation of insider trading and other
securities law violations.24
Each party to the MOU agrees to assist and cooperate with the investi-
231. Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K.-N. Ir., 26 I.L.M. 536 [hereinafter the Cayman
Islands Treaty]; see also Cayman Islands Mutual Assistance Treaty Should Aid Enforce-
ment Efforts, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1051 (July 18, 1986).
232. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, U.S.-Italy, 27
I.L.M. 574.
233. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1386.
234. See Current Issues, supra note 187, at 54.
235. Id. (citing Letter of Submittal, Senate Ex. F, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 18,
1976)).
236. See Current Issues, supra note 187, at 54.
237. For example, "except for cases of organized crime, the offenses investigated must
have dual criminality" for the Swiss Treaty to apply. Id. But see generally Netherlands
Treaty, supra note 229 (does not require dual criminality).
238. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1386.
239. See id.
240. See id.
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gations conducted by the other.24 1 In 1982, the United States entered
into its first MOU with Switzerland,242 creating an official mechanism for
requesting and obtaining information needed in SEC investigations of in-
sider trading.243 The United States has subsequently entered into MOUs
with the United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry;2' the
Japanese Ministry of Finance;245 the Ontario, Quebec, and British Co-
lumbia Securities Commissions;2' the Brazilian Securities Commis-
sion;247 the Commission des Operations de Bourse of France;24 8 the
Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands;24 9 the Mexican Commission Na-
tional de Valores;250 and, most recently, with the Director General of
Norway's Banking, Insurance, and Securities Commission."5 Addition-
ally, on September 25, 1991, the United States and the United Kingdom
entered into a second, more comprehensive MOUL.2 2 The new MOU
"provides for mutual assistance 'across a wider range of laws and regula-
tions' and expands the forms of assistance the regulators may pro-
vide."' 253 Unlike treaties, MOUs are not binding agreements.,-, While
admittedly this means that neither party is strictly bound to cooperate,
the informal character of the MOUs, in contrast to the mutual assistance
treaties, apparently facilitates their swift enactment and implementa-
tion.2 5 The MOUs also eliminate the requirement that the subject mat-
ter of the investigation be an illegal activity in both countries, a
241. See id.
242. This initial MOU has been repealed and replaced with a new one. See infra note
243 and accompanying text.
243. Following the enactment of criminal insider trading laws in Switzerland, the
United States entered into a second MOU with Switzerland in 1987. See Current Issues,
supra note 187, at 64.
244. See US, U.K Sign Agreement to Share Securities, Commodities Information, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1397 (Sept. 26, 1986).
245. See US, Japan Sign Accord to Share Surveillance, Investigatory Information, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 769-70 (May 30, 1986).
246. Joint Press Release US, and Canadian Provincial Securities Regulators Sign
Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation in Enforcement, I 1O.S.C. Bull.
No. 1, Jan. 8, 1988.
247. See SEC Brazilian Officials Sign Memo to Enhance Enforcement Cooperation, 20
See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1059-60 (July 8, 1988). This is the SEC's first MOU with any
South American regulatory authority. According to the SEC "[t]he Brazilian MOU and
the Canadian MOU are the most comprehensive agreements on cooperation in enforce-
ment matters between securities regulators negotiated by the SEC." Id at 1059. The
Brazilian MOU expressly states that it is applicable to, among others, requests for assist-
ance regarding insider trading.
248. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1386.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. U.S., UK. Agree to Broader MOU First MOU Between Norway, US Signed, 23
See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1407 (Sept. 27, 1991).
252. See iL at 1406.
253. Id.
254. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1386.
255. See id. at 1387.
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characteristic of many of the bilateral treaties.256 Therefore, they are
particularly useful when the SEC is investigating activity that does not
constitute an offense in the foreign nation. Finally, MOUs often provide
broader coverage of securities offenses than do treaties.257
3. The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act
("ISECA,) 258
The SEC proposed ISECA to Congress in 1988, and Congress enacted
the legislation in two parts. First, ISECA includes a provision that al-
lows the SEC to assist foreign regulators in determining whether there
has been a violation of the foreign law, regardless of whether the conduct
constitutes an offense in the United States, something the SEC was previ-
ously unable to do. This provision was incorporated into Section Six of
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.29
This provision is reciprocal in nature, as it includes, as a consideration
for granting assistance, whether the requesting agency has agreed to pro-
vide assistance to the SEC.2" It is unlikely that the SEC will provide aid
to foreign authorities who fail to cooperate with SEC investigations in
their country.
The remaining proposed ISECA provisions were enacted in the Securi-
ties Acts Amendments of 1990.261 These provisions effectively exempt
the SEC from United States disclosure requirements of "confidential doc-
uments furnished by foreign securities officials to the SEC. '262 Thus the
SEC does not have to disclose confidential documents provided by for-
eign officials, making the officials more likely to disclose information.
The provisions also increase the SEC's authority to sanction securities
professionals who have conducted illegal activities in a foreign
country.263
256. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
257. The Canadian MOU, for instance, provides that the two regulatory agencies will
even "investigate, using subpoena power where necessary, on behalf of one another, to
ensure that the necessary information is obtained." Current Issues, supra note 187, at 73.
The Japanese MOU, however, provides for assistance only on a case-by-case basis. See
supra note 245.
258. See generally Comment, International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act
and Memoranda of Understanding, 31 Hare. Int'l L.J. 295 (1990) [hereinafter
Enforcement Cooperation Act] (outlining the provisions of this Act).
259. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 6, 102 Stat. 4677, 4681-4682 (1988).
260. See id. § 6(b)(2), 102 Stat. at 4682.
261. Securities Acts Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550, 104 Stat. 2713 (1990).
262. Enforcement Cooperation Act, supra note 258, at 295. This was an extremely sig-
nificant change, as foreign authorities and governments were often reluctant to provide
the SEC with confidential information essential to insider trading investigations because
this information was required to be disclosed under United States law. See id.
263. See Enforcement Cooperation Act, supra note 258, at 295.
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4. The International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO"1) 2 6
4
Finally, in addition to international legislation, international organiza-
tions further enable cooperation among national securities regulators.
IOSCO is an international organization of securities regulatory agencies,
originally organized by Great Britain, that meets annually and provides a
forum for participating agencies to discuss current securities issues.2
IOSCO draws representatives from approximately ffty countries, and
with the continued development of insider trading regulations around the
world and almost daily announcements of new treaties and MOUs,
IOSCO becomes an increasingly important organization. 26 This organi-
zation is continuously working with participating nations to create legis-
lation facilitating further enactment of bilateral and multinational
cooperative agreements between securities authorities.267
CONCLUSION
As technological advancements continue to promote international eco-
nomic interaction, and as the movement towards the creation of a global
market continues, the regulation of national securities markets becomes
increasingly complex. Successful development of this world market has
led to a breakdown of the traditional system of unilateral securities
regulation.
Barriers to international regulation are beginning to erode, however, as
evidenced by the increasing enactment of insider trading and other secur-
ities legislation around the world. In addition to the adoption of national
legislation and enforcement policies, international cooperation has be-
come essential to policing insider trading activity. Efforts at interna-
tional cooperation have begun, encouraged primarily by those nations
with major legislation in this area, in the form of Mutual Assistance
Treaties, MOUs, and the establishment of international securities organi-
zations, such as IOSCO. The continued promotion of participation
through cooperative agreements, particularly multilateral agreements
and policies, is essential for successful prosecution and deterrence of in-
sider trading activity at the international level.
264. See Current Issues, supra note 187, at 90-91.
265. See, eg., Regulators Agree To Move Cautiously On Enforcement, Information Ex-
changes, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1861 (Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Regulators
Agree] (discussing talks at IOSCO's 13th annual meeting).
266. See SEC's Enforcement Program, supra note 2, at 1377.
267. See Regulators Agree, supra note 265, at 1862.
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